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HOME RULE AND THE
SECESSION OF STATEN ISLAND:
CITY OF NEW YORK v. STATE OF NEW YORK
In City of New York v. State of New York, 1 the New York
Court of Appeals held that chapter 773 of the Laws of 1989,2 a
"special law that prescribes a procedure for determining Staten
Islanders' interest in secession from New York City, and the
basis on which they would wish such separation to be
accomplished,"s3 was not an "'act in relation to the property,
affairs or government" 4 of the city of New York and, thus, did
not require a home rule message5 under the New York State
Constitution. 6 Naturally, the question that comes to mind is, if a
procedure that seeks to implement the secession of one of a city's
boroughs does not relate to the property, affairs or government of
a city, what in fact does? 7
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the development of
1. 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
2. Act of Dec. 15, 1989, ch. 773, 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563 (McKinney),
amended by Act of Mar. 1, 1990 ch. 17, 1990 N.Y. Laws 22 (McKinney).
Chapter 773, in pertinent part, asked the voters of the borough of Staten
Island: "Shall a charter commission to provide for the separation of the
borough of Staten Island from the city of New York and for the establishment
of the city of Staten Island be created ... ." Id. "If a majority answers yes, a
commission composed of Staten Island residents and legislators will be
organized to draft a proposed charter and consider any subject it deems
relevant to the organization of a new city of Staten Island." City of New York,
76 N.Y.2d at 483, 562 N.E.2d at 119, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
3. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 483, 562 N.E.2d at 118, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 154.
4. Id. at 483, 562 N.E.2d at 119, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (quoting N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2)).
5. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). A home rule message is a
message from the governor that an emergency exists, which allows the
legislature to enact a general or special law that relates "to the property, affairs
or government of a local government." Id.
6. Id.; City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 483, 562 N.E.2d at 118-19, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 154-55.
7. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 491, 562 N.E.2d at 124, 561
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the constitutional home rule in New York. Part II analyzes the
decision in City of New York v. State of New York. Part III
examines the potential consequences of secession. Finally, Part
IV examines how selected other states have dealt with municipal
home rule powers.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
NEW YORK'S HOME RULE
A. General vs. Special Laws
The notion of home rule8 was first embodied in the New York
State Constitution of 1894. 9 While establishing a distinction
between "general city laws ... which relate to all the cities of
one or more classes" 10 and "special city laws . . . which relate
8. See Judith A. Stoll, Note, Home Rule and the Sherman Act After
Boulder: Cities Between A Rock And A Hard Place, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 259,
259 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter Home Rule]."The term 'home rule' encompasses
the various means by which local governments are empowered by the State to
act autonomously in local matters." Id.; see also J.D. Hyman, Home Rule In
New York 1941-1965, Retrospect and Prospect, 15 BuFF. L. REV. 335, 337
(1965) [hereinafter Home Rule In New York]. "Today, 'home rule' is . . .
commonly understood to refer to two . . . closely related but independent
principles. One is the grant of affirmative power to municipalities. The other is
the imposition of restriction on state legislative interference in matters over
which the municipality does have affirmative power." Id. at 337-38.
9. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894).
10. Id.; see W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New
York, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 320 (1954) [hereinafter Constitutional City].
The Committee on Cities of the 1894 Constitutional Convention
proposed ... a classification of cities, the first class of which was to
consist of cities having a population of 50,000 or more, and provided
that laws relating to all cities of the same class were to be deemed
"general city laws." The committee's proposal further provided that
except as noted below the Legislature could act in regard to cities only
by "general" law in regard to specified matters traditionally viewed as
of primarily local concerns.
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to a single city, or to less than all the cities in a class," 11 the
provision enunciated a restriction applicable to special laws:
After any bill for a special city law, relating to a city, has been
passed by both branches of the Legislature, the house in which it
originated shall immediately transmit a certified copy thereof to
the mayor of such city, and within fifteen days thereafter the
mayor shall return such bill to the house from which it was sent,
or if the session of the Legislature at which such bill was passed
has terminated, to the Governor, with the mayor's certificate
thereon, stating whether the city has or has not accepted the
same.12
This amendment originated from a will to curtail "the practice
of extensive, detailed legislative intervention in the affairs of
New York City primarily." ' 13 As early as 1896, the New York
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the amendment should be
given a broad interpretation: A "liberal spirit. . . is especially
required in the interpretation of a remedial provision of the
fundamental law, so that, if possible, it shall be efficient to
secure the purpose of its enactment."
14
In 1923,15 the home rule amendment read:
The Legislature shall not pass any law relating to the property,
affairs or government of cities, which shall be special or local
either in its terms or in its effect, but shall act in relation to the
11. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894).
12. Id.; see Constitutional City, supra note 10, at 321. "The provision
provided the local governments with a 'suspensory veto,' and divided cities
into three classes. The first class included cities of 250,000 or more
inhabitants, the second class from 50,000 to 250,000, and the third class less
than 50,000." Id. at 321 n.34.
13. Home Rule in New York, supra note 8, at 340. "As formulated, it gave
the city only a suspensive veto: but since most legislation is passed in a rush at
the close of the session, it was an effective check in practice." Id.
14. People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N.Y. 367, 381, 44 N.E. 146,
150 (1896) (liquor tax law was not special law relating to the "property,
affairs and government of cities" because it applied to the entire state).
15. In 1907, in addition to changing the number of inhabitants of cities for
classification purposes, an amendment substituted the phrase "property, affairs
of government" to "property, affairs or government." NEv YORK STATE
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property, affairs or government of any city only by general laws
which shall in terms and in effect apply alike to all cities except
on message from the Governor declaring that an emergency
exists and the concurrent action of two thirds of the members of
each house of the Legislature. 16
Accordingly, the legislature enacted the City Home Rule Law,
with the intent to:
[P]rovide for carrying into effect the provisions of article twelve
of the Constitution pursuant to the direction contained therein
and hereby to enable cities to adopt and amend local laws for the
purpose of fully and completely exercising the powers granted to
cities by the terms and spirit of such article. 17
As of the 1923 amendment, sufficient legislation had been
enacted to serve the dual purpose of the home rule: to grant
affirmative power to local governments, and to enjoin the state
legislature from interfering in the field over which the
municipalities were granted such powers. 18 In this sense, home
rule can be deemed to implement the broader concept of
imperiwn in imperio, a model where "a limited sphere of power
has been carved out in which local governments are to be
autonomous and, conversely, an attempt has been made to
preclude legislative intrusion into purely local concerns." 19
NEW YORK CONsTrrUTION 1895-1937, 835 (1938).
16. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1923).
17. City Home Rule Law, ch. 363, § 30, 1924 N.Y. Laws 698, 706,
repealed by Municipal Home Rule Law, ch. 843, § 58, 1963 N.Y. Laws 1381,
1415 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 50(1)
(McKinney 1969)).
18. See, e.g., General City Law, ch. 327, 1900 N.Y. Laws 690, amended
by General City Law, ch. 26, 1909 N.Y. Laws 15 (codified at N.Y. Gen. City
Law (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992)).
19. Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 CoLUM. L. REv.
1145, 1147 (1966) [hereinafter New York Constitution]. "This policy was first
clearly expressed in the constitution of 1923, a document drafted under the
apparent influence of the concept that cities are creatures created by the grace
of the sovereign state and are, therefore, subject to its domination." Id.
[Vol 8
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B. Property, Affairs or Government
In 1938, the imperium in imperio theory was more clearly
integrated into the home rule article drafted at the New York
State Constitutional Convention. 20 The text expressly granted
cities the power to "adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent
with the constitution and laws of the state relating to its property,
affairs or government." 21 However, the crux of the local powers
remained defined by the extent of the "property, affairs or
government" of the municipalities.2 An attempt was made to
delete the troublesome phrase, and thereby limit the vulnerability
of cities from state interference. 23 However, the words were
reinserted into the final draft of the article after some members of
the committee voiced vigorous opposition to the modification. 24
20. 2 REV. RECORD, 1938, NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1364.
21. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (1938).
22. Id. The provision for an emergency message from the governor was
replaced by a "Home Rule Message" procedure from the city concerned with
the approval of two thirds of each house of the legislature. Id. This procedure
is still in force today. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). According to one
author:
Since the 1938 Amendment substitutes the request of the city for that of
the governor, the two-thirds requirement is obviously unnecessary to
protect the city. Indeed, that requirement only operates to make it more
difficult for a city to get legislation it may need and which is beyond its
power to enact locally.
W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York: 11, 55
COLUM. L. REv. 598, 604 (1955) [hereinafter Constitutional City 1I].
23. See NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1938,
JouRNAL AND DOCUMENTS, Doc. No. 1. The Report of the Committee on
Cities recommended: "The phrase, 'relating to property, affairs or government
of cities,' which has caused much uncertainty, is eliminated." Id. The bill
offered by the Committee on Cities for the Home Rule Amendment provided:
The legislature shall not enact laws which in effect apply within or to
any city, unless such laws in effect apply alike within or to all cities, or
unless such laws vest in any city power in addition to the power vested
in such city by this article, to enact or administer laws consistent with
the constitution, which apply within or to such city.
1 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, NEw YORK STATE CONSTITTIONAL
CONVENTION, 1938, No. 739, Int. 659.
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A home rule scholar noted that "it was the sense of the [1938]
Convention that 'property, affairs or government' be interpreted
in its judicially restricted sense and that the doctrine of state
concern embodied in the decision be carried forward. "25 Indeed,
the phrase left to the courts the freedom to determine, often
arbitrarily, the extent of the immunity of the local entities from
intrusive state legislation. By 1938, the New York courts had
already greatly undermined the authority given to the
municipalities by the home rule provisions.
In Adler v. Deegan,2 6 for example, the court had to decide the
constitutionality of the Multiple Dwelling Law27 as it applied to
the city of New York. 28 The court began by establishing that the
words "property, affairs or government" were terms of art, used
in the constitution "with a Court of Appeals definition, not that
of Webster's dictionary. "29 It then went on to point out the limits
CONVENTION 1348. An upstate delegate commented: "Is there anything in the
whole amendment which leaves any power in the Legislature to pass any
emergency legislation for a special city under any circumstances other than to
pass an act granting additional power to the city .... " Id.
25. Constitutional City I, supra note 22, at 605. "It is clear that the 1938
Convention did not intend to go further than the 1924 Amendments in
exempting cities from legislative interference." Id.
26. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
27. Act of Apr. 18, 1929, ch. 713, §7, 1929 N.Y. Laws 1663 (McKinney)
amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1946, ch. 950, 1946 N.Y. Laws 1761
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 1 (McKinney 1974 &
Supp. 1992)).
28. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 471, 167 N.E. at 706. The court stated that:
[The law] was passed in the manner in which other State legislation is
adopted, that is, by a majority vote, and not as an emergency measure,
by the concurrent vote of two-thirds of the members of each house of
the Legislature .... The act has been challenged as unconstitutional, in
that it violates the Home Rule provision of the State Constitution,
article XII, section 2. The Special Term ... decided that th[e] Multiple
Dwelling Law relates to the "property, affairs or government" of New
York City, and, therefore, should have been adopted by the action of
two-thirds of both houses of the Legislature, upon an emergency
message from the Governor. The law has, therefore, been declared
unconstitutional.
Id.
29. Id. at 473, 167 N.E. at 707.
[Vol 8800
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/4
HOME RULE
of this definition as it was set by previous decisions. 30 The court
cited Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York31 and McAneny v.
Board of Estimate32 for the proposition that rapid transit was a
matter of public interest which affected not only city residents,
but the people of the state as a whole. 33 Therefore, any law
affecting rapid transit did not interfere with the property, affairs
or government of the cities because "[ilt had been generally
regarded as a State affair." ' 34
Similarly, the court relied on Tenement House Department of
City of New York v. Moeschen35 to find that:
[Tihe police power of the State, in so far as it dealt with the
health of the people of the State, including those in the large
cities, has ever since, if not always, been considered a State
affair, a matter in which the people of the State as a whole were
interested, as contrasted with a local affair in which the people
of the cities had the first and final say.
36
30. Id.
31. 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E. 241 (1912). The court in Admiralty stated that
the Rapid Transit Act, dealing as it did directly with the railroads in New
York, was not a law which related to municipal property and affairs. Id. at
140, 99 N.E. at 250. The law was adopted not only for the benefit of cities,
but for the public at large. Id.
32. 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922). In McAneny, the court examined
the Public Service Commission Law which applied to the city of New York by
controlling transit in the city. Id. at 381-85, 134 N.E. at 188-90. However,
the court found that the "[r]apid transit for the city of New York has... been
a matter of public interest, affecting not only the people of that city, but the
whole state." Id. at 393, 134 N.E. at 193.
33. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 472-74, 167 N.E. at 706-07.
34. Id. at 474, 167 N.E. at 707 (citing McAneny v. Board of Estimate,
232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922)).
35. 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 23 (1904). Moeschen involved the
constitutionality of the Tenement House Act, which enabled the governor, in
1900, to appoint a committee to make a careful examination of the
healthfulness of tenement houses in cities and to make "such recommendations
as it deems wise to enable the best and highest possible condition for tenement-
houses in said cities to be attained." Id.; see Tenement House Act, ch. 334,
1901 N.Y. Laws 889 (McKinney), amended by Tenement House Act, ch. 352,
1902 N.Y. Laws 920 (McKinney), repealed by Act of Nov. 1, 1952, ch. 798,
1952 N.Y. Laws 977 (McKinney).
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After reaching the conclusion that health measures were a
matter of state concern, the court held that the Multiple Dwelling
Law,37 because it affected the health of the people of the state as
a whole, was properly enacted by the state legislature without an
emergency message and did not relate to municipal property,
affairs or government. 38 Therefore, the court held that the
Multiple Dwelling Law was constitutional. 39 This trend was to
proceed uninhibited.
In 1963, another feeble attempt was made to counteract the
narrow interpretation given by the courts to the controversial
"property, affairs or government" phrase. 40 The new home rule
amendment included a bill of rights for local governments, a
provision for a statute of local governments, and a statement that
the grant of local privileges and immunities should be given a
liberal construction. 41 This last addendum was apparently aimed
at annihilating Dillon's Rule. 42 However, since the local power
and the authorized interference by the state were still determined
by the judiciary's interpretation of what constitutes the "property,
The Tenement House Act was an affair of the city." Id.
37. Act of Apr. 18, 1929, ch. 713, § 7, 1929 N.Y. Laws 1663
(McKinney), amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1946, ch. 950, 1946 N.Y. Laws
1761 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 1 (McKinney 1974
& Supp. 1992)).
38. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 477, 167 N.E. at 708.
39. Id. at 478, 167 N.E. at 709.
40. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX (1963).
41. Id. § 2; see New York Constitution, supra note, 19 at 1152. The
amendment provided:
A bill of rights of local government; a grant of power with regard to ten
specific subjects outside the realm of property, affairs or government;
an authorization of a "statute of local governments" as a means of
further extending the grant of local power; and a declaration that local
privileges and immunities are to be liberally construed.
Id.
42. See Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH.
L. REv. 51, 54 n.22 (1989) [hereinafter Home Rule: Pluralism] "Dillon's
Rule holds that statutes delegating powers to local governments ought to be
strictly construed and consist only of those powers expressly granted,
necessarily implied, or indispensable." Id. (citing Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs,
25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868); J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 at
448-51 (5th ed. 1911)).
[Vol 8802
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affairs or government" of a city, the effort was in vain.
In Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 43 the court
determined the constitutionality of the Adirondack Park Agency
Act4 4 under article IX of the New York State Constitution. 45 The
court upheld the legislation as constitutional because it related to
something "other than the property, affairs or government of a
local government," 46 and was therefore included among the
powers granted to the state legislature by the home rule article of
the constitution. 47 The court acknowledged that the "terminology
[property, affairs or government had been] the subject of
recurring controversy." 48 It then went on to declare that the
43. 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977).
44. Id. at 491-92, 362 N.E.2d at 582, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 950; see
Adirondack Park Agency Act, ch. 348, 1973 N.Y. Laws 540 (McKinney)
(codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 27 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992)). The
Adirondack Park Agency Act consists of zoning and planning legislation
enacted by the state to ensure the preservation and development of the
resources of the Adirondack Park Region. Wambat, 41 N.Y.2d at 492, 362
N.E.2d at 582, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
45. Wambat, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 492, 362 N.E.2d at 582, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
950. "Under the act plaintiff was required to seek approval for its project from
the Adirondack Park Agency, created by the act to fashion a plan for future
use of the public and private lands within the park region." Id. at 492, 362
N.E.2d at 583, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 951. "The issue [was] whether
comprehensive zoning and planning enacted by the State Legislature to ensure
preservation and development of the resources of the Adirondack Park region,
without re-enactment at a second session, is invalid because it encroaches upon
the zoning and planning powers of local governments." Id. at 492, 362
N.E.2d at 582, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
46. Id. at 495, 362 N.E.2d at 585, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 953. The court noted
that this "does not end the matter." Id. "For plaintiff contends that with
adoption of the 1963 home rule amendment, in particular its direction that a
Statute of Local Governments be enacted, the powers reserved to the
Legislature have been qualified even in areas of recognized State concern." Id.
47. Id. at 498, 362 N.E.2d at 586, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 954. "The issue is
...whether the State may override local or parochial interests when State
concerns are involved. That issue is, and has been, resolved in favor of State
primacy." Id.
48. Id. at 493, 362 N.E.2d at 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (citing, inter
alia, Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 471, 167 N.E. 705, 706 (1929);
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Adirondack Park Agency Act "addressed . . . an issue of
substantial State concern." ' 49 The state concern in this case was
the preservation of the region from "despoliation, exploitation,
and destruction by a contemporary generation in disregard of the
generations to come." 50 The court distinguished state and local
concern in these terms: "[PIreserving the priceless Adirondack
Park through a comprehensive land use and development plan is
most decidedly a substantial state concern, as it is most decidedly
not merely 119 separate local concerns. ' 51 Therefore, the court
determined that although the statute interfered with the property,
affairs or government of the local municipalities, an overriding
state interest was present, namely the conservation of the
environment. 52
The current home rule states:
[The legislature shall] have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs or government of any local government only
by general law, or by special law only... on request of two thirds
of the total membership of its legislative body or on request of its
chief executive officer concurred in by a majority of such
membership .... 53
The meaning of the terms "general" and "special" laws have
not changed since the adoption of the first home rule provision in
49. Id. at 495, 362 N.E.2d at 585, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
50. Id. at 495, 362 N.E.2d at 585, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53.
51. Id. at 495, 362 N.E.2d at 584-85, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
52. Id. at 498, 362 N.E.2d at 586, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 954. The court stated
that:
The short of the matter is that neither Constitution nor statute was
designed to disable the State from responding to problems of significant
State concern. In this case the controversy is between the State and the
would-be developer of land for profit ... which understandably seeks
to promote its own development, even, if necessary, at the expense of
regional planning for the benefit of all the people and future
generations. Such a controversy is not resolvable by the principles
designed to encourage strong, decentralized, local government in
matters exclusively of local concern and to restrain the State from
paternalistic interference with local matters.
Id.
53. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
[Vol 8
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the 1923 constitution. In 1927, Chief Judge Cardozo defined a
"general law" as one that in terms and effect applies alike to all
cities. 54 In addition, this constitutional article now applies
equally to towns, villages, cities and counties. 55
It has been generally accepted that the concept of home rule
was incorporated into the constitutions of most states56 to serve
several purposes. Generally, article IX "evince[s] a recognition
that essentially local problems should be dealt with locally and
that effective local self-government is the desired objective." '57
By the same token, vesting more responsibilities in local
governments would free the state from these concerns. The state
would then be able to allocate more time and resources to state is-
sues. 58 This distribution would result in a more efficient
administration of both state and local matters. It should also be
noted that "local problems, in which the state has no concern,
can best be handled locally," 59 because the local governments are
54. In reElm Street In City of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, 76, 158 N.E. 24,
26 (1927). The court stated that:
The Home Rule Amendment established a new test. We are no longer
confined to the inquiry whether an act is general or local "in its terms."
Home Rule for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and after
many years of agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a form of
words and little else, if the courts in applying the new tests shall ignore
the new spirit that created their adoption. The municipality is to be
protected in its autonomy against the inroads of evasion.
Id. at 75, 158 N.E. at 25-26.
55. James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: "The Ghost of
Home Rule, " 59 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 713, 721 (1985) [hereinafter The Ghost
of Home Rule].
56. Home Rule, supra note 8, at 262 n.4. "By 1975, home rule had been
authorized by constitution or statute in every state except Indiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama. Forty states have constitutional home rule provisions, and
approximately half of those states have adopted such provisions since 1953."
Id.
57. Kelley v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d 522, 535, 443 N.E.2d 908, 912, 457
N.Y.S.2d 434, 438 (1982).
58. Home Rule, supra note 8, at 259 n.1. "The term 'home rule'
encompasses the various means by which local governments are empowered by
the State to act autonomously in local matters." Id.
59. -Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 160 N.E.2d 443,
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more sensitive to the needs of the community and better equipped
to satisfy them. 60
Additionally, the intent behind the home rule article "was to
provide some measure of protection to a city from possible
danger of ill-considered interference by the legislature in its local
affairs." ' 61 Notwithstanding these principles, the judiciary has
consistently labored at reducing home rule in New York to the
barest minimum. 62 Until the decision in City of New York v.
State of New York, 63 however, these limiting rulings were still
based on the notion of the existence of a superior state concern,
and did not simply dismiss the issue as unrelated to the municipal
property, affairs or government. 64
60. See Home Rule, supra note 8, at 262. "Local officials ... are more
competent to manage local affairs than are state legislatures, since local
officials are better informed about, and are more interested in local
conditions." Id. (citing 2 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 9.08 (3d ed. 1979)).
61. City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 435, 165
N.E. 836, 837 (1929). See generally People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149
N.Y. 367, 44 N.E. 146 (1896) (purpose of article was to give some measure
of protection to cities from the evils of special city legislation).
62. The Ghost of Home Rule, supra note 55, at 749. "This area --
'property, affairs or government,' - has been significantly narrowed and lacks
identity." Id.
63. 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
64. See generally Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 50, 473 N.E.2d
756, 484 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1984) (legislation limiting use of landfills to protect
water source for Nassau, Suffolk, and part of Queens counties from pollution
was a matter of state concern); Kelley v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d 522, 443 N.E.2d
908, 457 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1982) (legislation grouping counties into classes
according to population and requiring that full-time district attorneys be paid
salaries equivalent to the county court judges in those counties was a matter of
state concern due to state's interest in retaining quality district attorneys);
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d
581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977) (zoning and planning act designed to protect
Adirondack Park area addressed a matter of state concern); New York Steam
Corp. v. City of New York, 268 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172 (1935)
(unemployment relief is a matter of state concern); Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y.
467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929) (housing law was a matter of state concern because
it related to safety and health measures in which the state has an interest).
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The first instance in which it was established that the state
could, in certain circumstances, enact special laws with respect to
the property, affairs or government of a local entity was in the
1929 case of Adler v. Deegan.65 In Adler, the court held that the
Multiple Dwelling Act66  did not require an emergency
message, 67 because it related to health measures that were a
concern not only of the city of New York, but also of the state as
a whole.68 In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Cardozo stated
that when an issue of local interest is at hand, "the State, acting
by local laws and without an emergency message, must keep its
hands off unless a State concern is involved or affected, and this
in some substantial measure. ' ' 69 Judge Cardozo thus proposed
that the state concern be substantial. This decision resulted in
restricting the immunity of local governments from acts of the
legislature to matters relating to the property, affairs or
government of municipalities that did not also concern the state in
a substantial manner. 70
However sound in this particular instance, this decision,
unfortunately, did not help define the domain designated as the
property, affairs or government of New York City. As a result,
many special laws were upheld without requiring a home rule
message71 simply by declaring that a substantial state interest was
65. 251 N.Y. 467, 477-78, 167 N.E. 705, 708-09 (1929).
66. Act of Apr. 18, 1929, ch. 713, § 7, 1929 N.Y. Laws 1663
(McKinney), amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1946, ch. 950, 1946 N.Y. Laws
1761 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 1 (McKinney 1974
& Supp. 1992)).
67. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 478, 167 N.E. at 709. The emergency message
was subsequently replaced by the home rule request. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
68. Id. "Reason as well as authority justifies a conclusion that these health
measures must be a matter of State concern." Id.
69. Id. at 485, 167 N.E. at 711 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
70. Id. (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
71. See New York Steam Corp. v. City of New York, 268 N.Y. 137, 143,
191 N.E. 172, 173 (1935) (local bill can only be exempt from the home rule
article procedures if the state concern is a paramount one); but see Town of
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present, 72 while leaving the realm of the property, affairs and
government of the local entity unlimited and vulnerable to
multiplying restrictions.
73
II. CITY OF NEW YORK v. STATE OF NEW YORK:
ONE STEP FURTHER
In City of New York v. State of New York, 74 the existence of a
paramount state concern was not at issue. Significantly, neither
the lower courts nor the New York Court of Appeals attempted to
discern such an interest. The court's decision rested primarily on
its interpretation of the terms "property, affairs or
government." 75
As previously noted, under the current home rule article the
state cannot enact a special law that relates to the property, affairs
or government of a city without requiring a home rule message
pursuant to the article.76 If it were determined that chapter 77377
affected the property, affairs or government of New York City,
the state legislature would be permitted to interfere by special law
only if it was established that a state interest of a paramount
nature was present. 78 This two-step approach has been used in all
531 (1984). "If the subject matter of the statute is of sufficient importance...
the state may freely legislate, notwithstanding the fact that the concern of the
State may also touch upon local matters." Id.
72. New York Steam Corp., 268 N.Y. at 143, 197 N.E. at 173. The court
found a paramount concern existed since "[i]t is common knowledge that
widespread unemployment has undermined standards of living to a degree
which threatens the economic stability of State and Nation and affects the
welfare of all the American people." Id.
73. See Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 50, 473 N.E.2d 756, 484
N.Y.S.2d 528 (1984) (special law limiting disposal of solid waste by landfill
in Nassau County upheld because landfills pose threat to water supply of large
portion of state's population).
74. 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
75. Id. at 485, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
76. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2); supra note 5.
77. Act of Dec. 15, 1989, ch. 773, 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563 (McKinney),
amended by Act of Mar. 1, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 N.Y. Laws 22 (McKinney)
(relating to the secession of Staten Island from the city of New York).
78. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 490, 562 N.E.2d at 123, 561
808 [Vol 8
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/4
HOME RULE
the decisions pertaining to home rule in New York. 79
In this case, however, the court of appeals' determination was
based on a very succinct analysis of the first part of the test. The
court held that chapter 773 was not an "act in relation to the
property, affairs or government" of New York City and therefore
did not require a home rule message under the state
constitution. 80 Having reached this conclusion, the court did not
have to assess whether a state concern was present. This would
have been relevant only in the event of a finding of interference
with the municipal property, affairs or government. In fact, the
court merely stated that: "Here we discern no State interference
in New York City property, affairs or government, and we
therefore need not reach the next step of determining whether
there is any substantial State interest in the matter." 81
Significantly, this argument was not advanced by the state82 or
considered by either of the lower courts. 83
As previously discussed, the phrase "property, affairs or
government" has been the source of the problems experienced by
home rule in New York since its first appearance. 84 Most cases
N.Y.S.2d at 159 (Hancock, J., dissenting). "Once the effect on city affairs,
property or government is demonstrated, as it is here, a special act can be
passed without a home rule message only where a concern exists 'of sufficient
importance to the State, transcendent of local or parochial interests."' Id.
(Hancock, I., dissenting) (quoting Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New
York, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 494, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952
(1977)).
79. Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 483, 562 N.E.2d at 119, 561 N.Y.S. 2d at 155.
81. Id. at 485-86, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
82. Id. at 488, 562 N.E.2d at 122, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
83. City of New York v. State of New York, 158 A.D.2d 169, 173, 557
N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (1st Dep't 1990). The appellate division stated that
municipal boundaries were a matter of state concern and the law, therefore,
was not subject to home rule. Id.
84. See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 493,
362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951-52 (1977). "The terminology
. ..has been the subject of recurring controversy." Id. (citing, inter alia,
Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 471-73, 167 N.E. 705, 706-07 (1929);
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have avoided developing analyses based on a definition of the
phrase. Instead, courts have decided the issue by finding that a
state concern was present, rather than by asserting that the law
did not in fact relate to the property, affairs or government of the
city or local entity. 85 Only two cases have actually attempted to
address the extent of the phrase "property, affairs or
government." 86
In Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 87 the court held that the power to
alter ward boundaries88 through local legislation pertained to the
"property, affairs or government" of the city of Buffalo, and was
therefore within the powers granted to the cities by the home rule
article. 89 The court stated:
The mere altering of ward boundaries would seem, on its face,
clearly to come within the scope of the terms "property, affairs
or government" of a city. Only the city is affected by the
change. Residents of a county in which the city is located are not
affected. Certainly the state has no paramount interest in such
changes. Historically, these changes have been unopposed on
constitutional grounds and, indeed, local legislation is the usual
method by which changes in ward lines are effected. 90
This statement approximates the issue at hand more than any
other case ever decided by the New York Court of Appeals
because it specifically relates to boundaries. As pointed out by
Judge Hancock, one of the dissenting judges in City of New York,
241, 249-50 (1912)).
85. See The Ghost of Home Rule, supra note 55, at 715. "The balance
between state and local powers has tipped away from the preservation of local
authority toward a presumption of state concern. The foundation, property,
affair or government, has come to embody 'the ghost of home rule."' Id.
86. See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 493-
94, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951-52 (1977); Baldwin v. City
of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 172-73, 160 N.E.2d 443, 445, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129,
132-33 (1959).
87. 6 N.Y.2d 168, 160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
88. A ward boundary is "a division of a city or town for elections, police
and other governmental purposes." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1583 (6th ed.
1990).
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"[r]ealistically, no subject more directly concerns the affairs and
government of a city than whether the integrity of its boundaries
and of its existing governmental structure should be altered." 91
In City of New York v. Village of Lawrence,92 the court held
that a law regarding a boundary dispute between the City of New
York and Nassau County did not require an emergency message
because it did not affect the property, affairs or government of
New York City.93 The object of the dispute, however, was "[a]
strip of land . . . substantially unoccupied '[with] no public
buildings or structures of any character or any property of any
nature whatsoever of the city of New York'[;] no sewers[;]
no city water pipes or city light poles or wires.",94 This
description hardly bears any kind of resemblance to the borough
of Staten Island. The court recognized that, in different circum-
stances, a boundary modification might result in a "substantial
change in the city's internal affairs, its property or its
government . . . -95 City of New York seems to embody the
eventuality thus envisioned by the Lawrence court. Indeed, the
kind of change in boundary lines that would result from the
secession of Staten Island would have a very substantial impact
91. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 488, 562 N.E.2d at 122, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
92. 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929).
93. Id. at 434-35, 447, 165 N.E. at 837, 841. The court stated:
By chapter 802 of the Laws of 1928, entitled "An Act to define the
boundary line between the city of New York and town of Hempstead
along the eastern and southerly boundary lines of the former village of
Far Rockaway," the Legislature of the State has attempted to change the
description of a boundary line of the city. The act is, undoubtedly,
special or local in its terms and its effect, and it was not passed by the
Legislature on a message from the Governor declaring that an
emergency exists. The city of New York [claimed] that the act relates to
the property, affairs or government of the city, and in the absence of
such a message violates the provisions of section 2 of article XII of the
Constitution of the State of New York. [However] here the incidental
effect of the statute upon the property, affairs or government of the city
is so slight as to be almost illusory.
Id.
94. Id. at 445-46, 165 N.E. at 841.
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on New York City.
In City of New York, the court refused to address the issue of
whether secession legislation in this instance would have required
a home rule message pursuant to article IX, section 2(b)(2) of the
New York State Constitution. 96 Instead, it reasoned that chapter
773 would not be followed by an actual act of secession. 97
According to the court, the legislation merely "allows Staten
Island to explore its [already] publicized interest in secession,
stripped of any force without further act of the Legislature." 9 8
The court offered, as its basis for upholding the legislation the
contention that it does not interfere with the property, affairs or
government of the city of New York. 99 It stated that the law does
not actually authorize, initiate or support secession. 100 Therefore,
its impact on New York City is merely speculative. Similarly, the
court added, rather boldly, that New York City should have
begun taking anticipatory measures after the decision in Morris v.
Board of Estimate,10 1 which presumably publicized Staten
Island's interest in secession. 102
96. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 484, 486, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 156; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
97. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 484, 486, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 156.
98. Id. at 487, 562 N.E.2d at 121, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
99. Id. at 485-86, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
100. Id. The court stated that:
Chapter 773 does not authorize secession; it does not authorize the
voters of Staten Island to decide the secession issue; it does not initiate
secession, or commit the State to support it; it does not represent any
relinquishment by the Legislature of any power it may have with respect
to secession; and it in no way circumscribes whatever protections exist
in the State Constitution home rule provision with respect to an act
formally triggering secession.
Id. at 486, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
101. 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
102. Id. at 688-90. In Morris, the court held that the Board of Estimate
(created in 1901, three years after the creation of a consolidated city of New
York, and which gave one seat, with equivalent voting power, to each borough
president) afforded Staten Island voting power in excess of its population (only
5.2% of the population of New York), in contravention of the "one person,
one vote" principle. Id. After Morris, a new charter was established that
transferred the powers of the abolished Board of Estimate to the City Council,
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There can be little or no doubt as to the fact that chapter 773
interferes to a large extent with the property, affairs and
government of New York City. 103 The law can be described as
implementing a process geared toward the secession of the
borough of Staten Island from the city of New York, and the
creation of a city of Staten Island. 104 This procedure would be
initiated by a referendum presenting the following question to the
people of Staten Island: "Shall the borough of Staten Island
separate from the city of New York to become the city of Staten
Island?" 105 If the outcome of this referendum is an affirmative
vote, a charter commission will be created. 106 The purpose of
this commission would be to draft a charter for Staten Island
City, in turn to be submitted to residents of Staten Island for
approval. If the charter is not acquiesced to, the voters vil then
be asked whether an alternative charter should be drafted, 107 and
apportioned by population. It is recognized that this change in the
governmental structure was the impetus behind the enactment of chapter 773.
Id.; see City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 486, 562 N.E.2d at 121, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 157.
103. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 487, 562 N.E.2d at 121, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 157 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Judge Hancock stated that "[t]he
court today holds that a measure which establishes a detailed process aimed at
splitting New York City into two separate cities - while depriving four of its
five boroughs from any voice in the process - does not affect its property,
affairs or government. I cannot agree." Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
105. Act of Dec. 15, 1989, ch. 773, § 1 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563
(McKinney), amended by Act of Mar. 1, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 N.Y. Laws 22
(McKinney). The court in City of New York v. State combined both versions
of the law and simply refered to it as "chapter 773." City of New York, 76
N.Y.2d at 483, 562 N.E.2d at 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
106. Act of Dec. 15, 1989, ch. 773, § 4 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563
(McKinney), amended by Act of Mar. 1, 1990, ch. 17, § 3(e) 1990 N.Y. Laws
17 (McKinney). The section provides that:
In the event the greatest number of votes cast in said election are in the
affirmative, a charter commission for the city of Staten Island shall be
created for the purpose of drafting a charter for such city which charter
shall be submitted to such voters of such borough for approval.
Id.
107. Id. § (4)(d). This section provides, in pertinent part, that: "Provided
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the commission would be given six additional months to draft a
new charter. 108 If the charter is approved, it would then take
effect upon the enactment of state legislation. 109
It is important to note that at no time the voters of the other
boroughs would be involved in this process. Moreover, it is
apparent that the charter commission would not be created merely
to study the position of Staten Islanders with respect to an act of
secession. Rather, the commission is legally required to support
secession, as is shown by the provision for the draft of an
alternative charter if the original one does not satisfy the
voters. 110 Since it does not involve other boroughs in the
process, 111 chapter 773 is plainly designed to use all possible
means to draft a charter based on the interests of the borough of
Staten Island, at the expense of New York City. 112
This procedure alone would have a significant impact on the
property, affairs- and government of New York City. The
referendum is to be submitted at a general election, which implies
that the city's resources and personnel will be used to that end,
of Staten Island are cast in the negative, shall such charter commission
continue in existence for the purpose of drafting an alternative proposed
charter for the city of Staten Island?" Id.
108. Id. § (4)(e). This section provides, in pertinent part, that: "[T]he
charter commission shall remain in existence for six months duration for the
purpose of drafting an alternative proposed charter for the city of Staten Island
in the manner prescribed herein." Id.
109. Id. This section provides, in pertinent part, that:
If the charter for the city of Staten Island submitted by such charter
commission receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast
in such election, such charter shall take effect as specified therein and
until such time, the borough of Staten Island shall remain part of the
city of New York.
Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. § 4(a). The commission would be composed exclusively of
Staten Island residents and of members of the New York State Legislature
representing Staten Island. Id. Each of these legislators would appoint an
additional member, who must be a resident of Staten Island. Id. Moreover,
voters of the other boroughs or city officials are not to take part in the process,
at any time. Id.
112. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 488-89, 562 N.E.2d at 122-23, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 158-59 (1990) (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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including preparation of ballots and certification of the results. 113
The commission may literally "request and receive from any
state or city of New York department, board, bureau,
commission, office, agency or other instrumentality such
facilities, assistance, data and personnel as may be necessary or
desirable for the proper execution of its powers and duties. "114
Although most of these expenditures are to be reimbursed later
by the state, there can be no doubt as to their imposing an unfair
burden on the city of New York, in light of the fact that it would
not be consulted in any manner. Moreover, the mere prospect of
the secession of Staten Island is likely to create "uncertainty and
confusion" and to interfere with city planning. 115
III. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SECESSION
Chapter 773 does not in itself authorize secession. Rather, it
establishes procedures that are designed to first obtain the
approval of Staten Islanders and then to implement secession. 116
Were these procedures to actually result in the secession of Staten
Island, the property, affairs and the government of New York
City would be deeply affected. 117 Secession would have an
impact on the population and geographic size of New York
113. Act of Dec. 15, 1989, ch. 773, § 4(f), 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563
(McKinney), amended by Act of Mar. 1, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 N.Y. Laws 22
(McKinney) ("The provision of the election law . . . shall apply to the
question submitted ....".
114. Id. § 6(e).
115. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 489-90, 562 N.E.2d at 123, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 159 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Judge Hancock stated that "[t]his
widespread uncertainty necessarily impairs effective present-day city planning
for the future in several governmental areas." Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
116. See Act of Dec. 15, 1989, ch. 773, § 4(e), 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563
(McKinney), amended by Act of March 1, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 N.Y. Laws 22
(McKinney).
117. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 488, 562 N.E.2d at 122, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Judge Hancock stated "chapter
773 reveals that the process intrudes deeply into city affairs and has a direct
and immediate impact on the personnel, finances and administration of the
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City. 118 Secession would remove four hundred thousand New
Yorkers who reside in Staten Island, "more people than the entire
population of Buffalo, and more people than the populations of
Rochester and Albany combined or Syracuse and Albany
combined." 119 Staten Island also extends over 19.5% of the
city's total land area. 120
The city has also invested in a large infrastructure located on
Staten Island: "[Mlore than 50 schools, more than 25 parks, 18
firehouses, approximately a dozen libraries, cultural facilities[,]
. . . police precincts, a hospital, a ferry terminal, over 1,000
miles of paved streets, almost 900 miles of water pipes, over 650
miles of sewers, 33,475 street lights, and a variety of other
buildings and properties." ' 121 These include the Fresh Kills
landfill, used to dispose of nearly all of New York City's 20,000
tons of waste collected daily. 122
Also, it can be shown that secession of Staten Island would
impact on New York City's fiscal affairs by reducing its
property, sales and income tax. 123 The city would have to forego
the benefit of the borough's share in an outstanding long-term
bonded debt as well, which amounts to more than 10 billion
dollars. 124 Additionally, separation of Staten Island from the city
is likely to cause the default of bond covenants made by the
Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York. 125
In the event of the loss of one of its boroughs, New York City
118. See Brief for Appellant at 10, City of New York v. State of New
York, 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
119. Id. at 10-11.
120. Id. at 11. "Secession will [therefore] bring about a significant
reduction in the City's geographic size." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 12. "The secession of Staten Island would impact upon the city's
fiscal affairs. Secession would obviously deprive the City of property, sales,
income and other taxes." Id.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 26. Municipal Assistance Corporation of the City of New York
[MAC] Chairman, Felix Rohatyn, noted that MAC revenue streams, derived
from the Special Sales Tax and the city's share of Per Capita Aid, are likely to
decrease in the event of secession. Id.
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would be forced to restructure its government, notably the city
council, and possibly to revise its charter. 126 These costly and
lengthy modifications could be extremely damaging to an already
troubled and heavily burdened municipality.
The court refused to consider whether secession itself would
impact upon the property, affairs or government of the city. 127
However, chapter 773 is essentially designed to set in motion all
that is necessary to implement secession. 128 It seems unrealistic
that the state legislature, after enacting chapter 773, would stop
short of enabling Staten Island to secede in the event of an
affirmative vote to the referendum and proposed charter. As
previously discussed, no paramount state interest has been ad-
vanced by the court that would justify the enactment of this
126. Id. at 15. The Appellant argued that:
In addition, secession would require either that City Council districts be
redrawn or that the size of the City Council be changed. Under the
recently adopted Charter, the Council will be expanded from 35 to 51
members, with the expanded Council to be first elected in November
1991 .... The secession of Staten Island, which under the timetable set
forth in Chapter 773 could take effect no earlier than May 1993, would
require either another drawing of the 51 Council seats among four
remaining boroughs or a charter amendment to the size of the City
Council once again.
Id.
127. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 484, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561
N.Y.S.2d at 156. The court stated its uncertainty as to "whether genuine
secession legislation, if ever it were to come before the legislature, would
require a home rule message." Id.
128. Id. at 484, 562 N.E.2d at 119, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 155. The court noted
that:
Significantly, as made explicit by later amendment to chapter 773, no
act or proposal of the various Staten Island committees or commissions
can have the force of law. The charter, or alternative charter, for the
city of Staten Island can become law only if the Legislature enacts
legislation enabling Staten Island to disengage and separate from the city
of New York. The law specifically directs that until such time, "the
borough of Staten Island shall remain a part of the city of New York."
Id. (quoting Act of Dec. 15, 1989 ch. 773, 1989 N.Y. Laws 1563
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special law without a home rule message. 129 Therefore, although
the judiciary has consistently retired home rule further and
further into oblivion, this court has ruled against and beyond all
previous binding authority on the matter.
IV. HOME RULE IN OTHER STATES
Earlier in the century, home rule appeared to hold a higher
standing in California. 130 One scholar noted that the home rule
provision of the California State Constitution made "'the
California city the best protected in the United States against the
corrupt or misguided efforts of outsiders to save her from
herself.' 13 1 The provision grants cities immunity from state
intervention by special as well as general laws, if these relate to
129. Id. at 490, 562 N.E.2d at 123, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 160 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hancock stated that:
Once the effect on city affairs, property or government is demonstrated,
as it is here, a special act can be passed without a home rule message
only where a concern exists "of sufficient importance to the State,
transcendent of local or parochial interests." The court's holding that
chapter 773 was properly passed without a home rule message in the
absence of a showing of such State concern contradicts prevailing
authority and ignores the significant enlargement of municipal home
rule protections given to municipalities in the new reformatted local
governments provision of article IX, adopted on January 1, 1964.
Id. at 490-91, 562 N.E.2d at 123-24, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d
490, 494, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (1977)).
130. Constitutional City II, supra note 22, at 626. "Other states, notably
California, have achieved a great measure of home rule through constitutional
provisions interpreted by sympathetic courts." Id.
131. Id. at 626 n.215 (quoting Thomas H. Reed, Municipal Home Rule in
California, 1 NAT'L MUN. REv. 569, 574 (1912)). The author noted:
[Te sum up the privileges of California cities: (1) They may make their
own charters subject to a formal submission to the legislature which
always approves them; (2) These charters prevail over general laws,
even in all matters affecting the internal affairs of the municipality; (3)
Special or local laws are forbidden; (4) They may adopt any kind of
ordinance or regulation even outside the field of strictly "municipal
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"municipal affairs." 132 However, the interpretation of the term
"municipal affairs" is still left to the courts. The extent, and
even the existence, of home rule happened to have fallen into the
hands of "sympathetic courts."' 133 This terminology proved
nearly as problematic as New York's "property, affairs or
government." The phrase "municipal affairs" was referred to as
"loose, indefinable, wild words." 134
The Illinois State Constitution home rule provision was
described as "a particularly interesting example of how to create
and implement a robust notion of home rule.", 135 However, it
does not differ significantly from the New York version. As in
New York, Dillon's Rule is abolished. 136 The scope of home
132. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 5(a). This section provides:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city
governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions
and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other
matters they shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted
pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and
with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith.
Id.
133. Constitutional City II, supra note 22, at 626.
134. Exparte Braun, 74 P. 780, 784 (Ca. 1903) (Beatty, C.J., dissenting)
("The decision of the court is rested and necessarily depends upon the
construction given to the phrase 'municipal affairs . ... "'); see Sho Sato,
"Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1055, 1075 (1972). Sato
proposed three standards designed to clarify the term "municipal affairs." Id.
at 1075-78. The first standard was: "State laws should prevail where such laws
deal with substantial externalities of municipal improvements, services, or
other activities, regardless of whether the general laws are directed only to the
public sector." Id. at 1076. The second standard was: "State laws should
govern if their policies are made applicable to the public and private sectors."
Id. The third standard was: "Matters of intracorporate structure and process
designed to make an institution function effectively, responsively, and
responsibly should generally be deemed a municipal affair." Id. at 1077.
135. Home Rule: Pluralism, supra note 42, at 67; see ILL. CONST. art. VII
§ 6(m), which states that "[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be
construed liberally." Id.
136. See Home Rule: Pluralism, supra note 42, at 67. The constitution
provides that the "'[plowers and functions of home rule units shall be




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
rule powers extends as far as the city's "government and
affairs." 137 The state's legislative reach is defined in these terms:
"Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with
the state any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent
that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the
concurrent exercise or specifically declare the state's exercise to
be exclusive."' 138 This article is not likely to provide the kind of
guidelines which would be helpful in order to ensure the survival
of home rule for cities.
In fact, a constitutional text by its nature draws broad outlines
and it would be almost impossible to embody the precision
required to remain faithful to the intent of its framers. 139 The
problem which faces home rule today results from a consistent
bias of the courts in favor of the state and to the detriment of the
cities.140 It was pointed out that "[t]his stance ignores the state's
of grants of power to localities." Id. (quoting ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m)).
For a discussion of Dillon's Rule see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
137. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(a). This section provides, in pertinent part,
that:
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any
power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs
including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of
the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to
incur debt.
Id.
138. Id. § 6(i).
139. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). The United
States Supreme Court stated that:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore,
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this
idea was entertained by the framers of the American Constitution, is not
only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the
language.
Id.
140. Home Rule: Pluralism, supra note 42, at 68. The author stated that:
[Vol 8820
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interest in supporting effective local government, and
in encouraging localities to develop their own decision
making mechanisms governing their own institutions.,, 141 The
mere existence of home rule stands to acknowledge the need,
not only of the cities, but of the state entities, for a
decentralization of legislative powers. 142 The judiciary branch,
by denying home rule the deference it is due, has deprived the
whole net of interaction between city and state of a sound and
needed structure.
CONCLUSION
Courts have annihilated the ability of cities to exercise their
home rule powers as to issues with respect to which the state has
a paramount interest. 143 One could argue that the state would be
justly concerned with laws pertaining to the environment or the
health and safety of its inhabitants. 144 However, it is difficult to
conceive that the secession of Staten Island from the city of New
York could be determined to lie outside the realm encompassing
the property, affairs and government of New York City.145 In
fact, it would be almost impossible to think of a more essential
need than for a city to be in control of its physical integrity. The
court of appeals, in City of New York v. State of New York, 146 by
allowing Staten Island to set in motion its separation from the
other boroughs, has done little more than give its blessing to a
secession.
Courts, aided and abetted by the academic bar, have not uncommonly
regarded themselves as stewards of the center, quick to overrule local
initiatives which directly or indirectly impede the "implementation of
statutes which sought to further a specific statewide policy," in order to
assure the uniformity and supremacy of state law vis-a-vis local
enactments.
Id. (quoting Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 44 (Alaska 1974)).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 69-71.
143. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 26-52 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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The motivation for such a decision is difficult to assess,
principally due to the levity of its reasoning. 147 Nevertheless, the
principles which led the people to embody the notion of home
rule into the state's constitution and legislation have doubtlessly
been defeated. Indeed, whether home rule was meant to protect
municipalities from unwarranted state interference, or to grant
local entities both responsibilities and immunities by delegating
certain powers in order to allow state and city to administrate
their affairs more efficiently, this intent has been betrayed,
wholly without justification.
Florence L. Cavanna
147. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
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